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STUDENT NOTES
person in Maryland, who went into Pennsylvania and died. It held
,that the laws of Maryland were violated and that Maryland could
punish; while in Green v. State, 66 Ala. 40 (1880), the defendant gave
a fatal blow in Alabama, which resulted in death in another state.
Here the common law had been abrogated by statute, but the court
said that the defendant could be held, in the absence of statute, and
that death was only consequential to the defendant's act; while the
West Virginia court, in ex parte Mc2eeley, 14 S. E. 436 (1892), held
that where a man was shot in Kentucky and death occurred in West
Virginia they had no jurisdiction over the case. The same view is
taken by the New Jersey court in State v. Carter, 3 Duch. 499 (1859),
because to hold a person in that state there must be some offense
against the sovereignty of that state and the ceming into the state
was the will of the deceased and no act of the defendant.
The law seems to be fairly well settled that when a person standing in one state releases a deadly force which finds its mark in another state, notwithstanding that death may occur in a third state,
that the state in which the blow was given has jurisdiction over the
crime; and if there is any variance in the respective state courts as
to which shall punish the criminal, it is probably due to the statutes
2 and 3 of Edward VI, which were taken as part of the common law
by some states and omitted by ethers. And in the absence of statute
there seems to be no provision for holding the defendant in state A,
for no crime has been committed in that state.
Roy L. FH&mTmTOxm

CRrMAx
JunismrcTios-Srrus or THE CuI m-D,
standing in X
state, shoots B in Y state. B is carried to a hospital m Z state, where
he expires.
Winch state, or states, have Jurisdiction over D If they are able
to capture him within their boundaries? Our immediate problem is
to attempt to suggest a method by which D may legally be tried for.
the murder in Z, the state in which the deceased died.
A brief analysis of the case will show that necessary elements
of -the crime of murder are lacking in each of the three states. The
shot and the intent exist in X, the blow takes effect in Y, and the
death occurs in Z.
It is the overwhelming weight of authority that a person, who in
one jurisdiction, does an act which takes effect and constitutes a crime
in another, may be tried and punished in the latter, Clark and
Marshall, 494, Lnmdsay v. State, 38 Ohio State 507 (1882). Upon attempting to find the line of reasoning of these cases, it seems that
*he principal point Is that the act took effect in this state. Ix other
words, the force started in X state, had it's consummation here, or
to quote from the dissenting opinion of Campbell, J. in Tyler v.
People, 8 Michfgan 320 (1860)
"There is but one guilty act, the death
is the mere consequence." This seems to be the only reason generally
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advanced to support this view, yet it is obvious that the blow is only
one of the three important elements of the crime. The act, coupled
with the intent, occurred in X, the victim died in Z.. It is to be
seen then, that tis
rule as to the place of jurisdiction is purely
arbitrary.
Would it not be as convenient and legally justifiable to hold that
Z state has jurisdiction?
The arguments against holding D in Z state are based upon the
theory that no part of the criminal act was done at the place of
death. To quote Campbell, a. futher, Tyler v. People, 8 Michigan 320
(1860). "The languishing alone, 'which is not any part of the offense,"
is the only act in Z. Holding 'him here would be "making the guilt
of the offender spring from the acts of others, and not from his own."
It may be seen however, that the force put in motion by D, had
it's fruition here. It was in Z state that the crime reached it's natural
end. This element, the actual death, should certainly be as essential
as any of the others, for how else may murder be consummated except
by death of the victim? The very essence of murder is the death;
without it there could be no crime of murder. Yet the place of death
has no jurisdiction because there is no part of D's act here.
As to the other part of the able arguments of Campbell 3. that
holding D. in Z "is making the guilt of the offender spring from the
acts of others, and not from Ins own," it is suggested that it is the
common legal doctrine that one is responsible for the natural and
probaole consequences of his act, Beale, "The Probable Consequences
of an Act," 33 Harvard Law Review 633 (1869) Gray, 3. in Commonsvealth v. Macloon, 101 Mass. Reports 1 says in this respect, "But it is
the nature and the right of every man to move about at his pleasure,
except so far as restrained by law; and whoever gives him a mortal
blow assumes the risk of this, and in view of the law, as in that of
"
morals, takes his life wherever he happens to die of that wound.
The historical view is that the place of death should be the place
of jurisdiction, Statutes 2 & 3 Edward VI, c. 24 (1548), declared that
the offense should be indictable and punishable in the county in
which the death occurred. This statute came into being early enough
to be a part of our common law. It would seem from this that legally
Z has as much grounds for having jurisdiction as does Y.
The reason generally given in order that Y might have jurisdiction is that D, by shooting the bullet into Y state, constructively follows it into the state. "There may be a constructive presence in a
state, distinct from any personal presence, by which the crime may
be consummated in another state and so be punishable there." Grayson
v. U S. 272 Federal Reporter 553, (1921), In Re Pallister, 136 U. S.
257 (1889).
This is purely a fiction of law, as the word "constructively" admits, yet it is one of -the strongest reasons -for holding that Y has
jurisdiction. Is it not possible that this same fiction might be logically
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extended so as to include Z? Since D has constructively followed the
victim into Y state, it is only reasonable that he should constructively
follow the victim until natural and probable consequences of his act
have run their full course. The general principle is that one who
does a criminal act in one state may be -held liable for it's continuous
operation in another; Commonwealh v. Blanding, 3 Pick. 304 (1825).
"Anyone who publishes a libel in another state, in a newspaper which
circulates in this Commonwealth is liable to indictment here." There
Is no more reason against holding D criminally liable in the state
where his victim dies from the continuous operation of this mortal
blow than in those to which the circulation of the libel extends the
injury to reputation.
In conclusion, let it be noted that we have attempted to point
out the followings facts: (1) The offense of murder or manslaughter
Is consummated only by the death of the party assailed, therefore
the place of death should be as important as the place of assault;
(2) There is no legal repsoning for not holding it so; (3) The reasoning in this type of case must of necessity be largely fictional, (4)
And there is no good reason why this fiction may not be applied to
the place of death as well as to the place of the assault.
Fortunately, this problem is now largely covered by statutes, making -the offense indictable in either of the places mentioned in this
discussion, 30 Michigan Law Review 238.
Kn MonnaLY.

